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Abstract  
 
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs) have been at the core of the remarkable 
expansion of social protection in Latin America in the early 21st century. Our article reviews 
the origins of CCTs in the Social Investment approach to social policy design, explores their 
characteristics and their traces expansion in Latin America. It further questions whether 
CCTs designed under the influence of SI can generate long-term substantial improvements in 
social outcomes. Our analysis suggests that while CCTs have evidently produced a number of 
positive outputs they are not, on their own, enough to achieve the aim of reducing poverty.  
CCTs appear to be more effective in poverty alleviation when they are accompanied by –or 
form part of– a wider package of measures that enhance social and employment rights, 
integrating workers into formal economy under better conditions. We conclude that unless 
the structural deficiencies that shape many of the Latin American welfare regimes are 
addressed, the potential of social investment policies, like CCTs, to combat poverty will 
remain limited.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Social protection in Latin America has transformed significantly during the last two decades. 
By the end of 20th century the ‘truncated’ development of most Latin American welfare 
regimes had produced social insurance systems of limited coverage protecting, primarily, 
formal sector urban workers and their families  (Barrientos 2009; Filgueira and Filgueira 
2002; Franco 2006). However, during the present century, the majority of governments in the 
region began to transform their welfare regimes by extending social protection to previously 
excluded families and social groups. Conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) have 
been, and continue to be, at the centre of this transformation.  
 
CCTs are effectively social assistance programmes that deliver means-tested conditional cash 
benefits to poor families. Payment of benefits is dependent on the participating family 
meeting certain conditions like participating in a number of health related activities or 
ensuring children’s school attendance. The theoretical and normative principles that 
influenced the design of CCTs are to be found in the social investment (SI) perspective. SI is 
an emerging approach to social policy design that seeks to ‘adapt’ social protection to 
contemporary economic and social conditions, by prioritising policies that invest in human 
capital  (Jenson 2010; Morel et al. 2012). In fact, CCTs represent a paradigmatic case of 
applying the SI perspective in social programme design.  
 
CCTs were originally introduced in Brazil and Mexico in the second half of the 1990s but 
were adopted rapidly throughout the region and beyond. By 2015 every country in Latin 
America had a CCT programme and nowadays variants of CCTs can be found in almost 
every continent (Barrientos 2011; Fizsbein and Schady 2009). Following up from two 
decades since their initial implementation, our article seeks to provide an overview of the 
current state of CCTs in Latin America, to present key arguments made in recent academic 
literature in favour and against them, and to evaluate their achievements and shortcomings in 
terms of their potential to address the region’s social protection challenges, many of which 
are shared not only with semi-peripheral and peripheral regions, but also with countries in the 
capitalist core in what has been termed as economic ‘North’. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the SI perspective and its 
adoption for the design of social policy in Latin America. The third section outlines the 
principal characteristics of CCTs. The fourth section offers an overview expansion process of 
CCTs throughout the region during the last two decades. The next section discusses the 
achievements and shortcomings of CCTs in terms of their potential to reduce poverty levels. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
2. The Social Investment Perspective in Latin America 
 
Since the first decades of the twentieth century, social protection in Latin America had been 
based on bismarckian social insurance systems that unlike their counterparts in Europe, not 
only did not achieve universal coverage, but in many countries did not even reach half of the 
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population  (Filgueira and Filgueira 2002; Mesa-Lago 2000). However, during the 1990s, 
coinciding with processes of political and economic liberalisation, a process of major 
transformation of social protection began characterised its expansion albeit under different 
principles. The principles that have guided the expansion of social protection include the 
recognition of markets as the medium to break with poverty; the co-responsibility of 
individuals for their own welfare; subsidies to demand by delivering transfers rather than 
offer; decentralisation of services; an emphasis on the neediest groups and on precise 
targeting of potential beneficiaries; and the importance of the impact of programmes 
measured in comparison with their initial objectives  (Franco 2006). Principles like these ones 
have been conceptualised under the social investment perspective and materialised in the 
form of CCTs  (Jenson 2010; Franco 2006). 
 
The social investment perspective represents an emerging social policy paradigm different 
from traditional Keynesianism and neoliberalism, that emphasises the investment in human 
capital and views social policy as productive factor for economic development and 
employment growth, in order to address contemporary economic and social conditions like 
 (Morel et al. 2012; Jenson 2010). Under these perspective, social policy should be about 
investing in human capital to provide the necessary resources for people to face economic 
risks, promoting co-responsibility, not only rights, guaranteeing equality of opportunities and 
prioritising active policies rather than passive forms of social protection  (Morel et al. 2012; 
Giddens 1998). It is a child-centred perspective, since investment in this group is considered 
necessary to provide future adults with the capabilities to face risks, assume responsibility for 
their own welfare, and promote equality of opportunities in society. The perspective has been 
officially adopted by the European Union, international organisations and governments in the 
Americas for the design of social policies  (Jenson 2010; Cantillon 2011). 
 
Some authors have traced the origins of the social investment perspective back to Sweden in 
the 1930s, where concerns about low fertility rates during an economic crisis resulted in the 
promotion of social policies that aimed to invest in human capital and support economic 
growth and productivity. Nonetheless, it was not until after the failure of neoliberalism in the 
1990s that the perspective spread, recognising a role for state intervention, albeit adapting it 
to contemporary economic and social condition, and prioritising investment in policies that 
aim to minimise the intergenerational transmission of poverty and to promote equality of 
opportunity in the present to improve future living standards  (Morel et al. 2012). Social 
investment is meant to adapt social policy to the so called ‘knowledge-based economy’, 
which should rest on a skilled and flexible labour that can adapt to the constantly changing 
needs of the economy and be a motor of those same changes due to its potential for 
innovation.  
 
Lavinas  (2013) on the other hand, has placed the origins of concerns with human capital 
formation in the work of economists of the University of Chicago, who applied it to explain 
differences in levels of development across countries. According to this account, these 
economists disputed Dependency Theory then popular throughout the Global South, by 
arguing that the key to understanding why some countries were underdeveloped lied in their 
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failure to promote human capital, diverting the attention from structural factors. This view 
was adopted by the United States development agency (USAID) and promoted throughout 
Latin America since the 1970s. According to this author, that perspective would have been 
epitomised a few decades later in the form of CCTs.  
 
3. Characteristics of CCTs 
 
CCTs offer targeted cash transfers to poor families with school and health conditionalities. 
Their main aim is to break with the intergenerational transmission of poverty by investing in 
the formation of human capital. There are differences in the objectives that some programmes 
claim to pursue1, but in practice all of them focus on the formation of human capital of poor 
families, and they share several basic characteristics that represent innovations in anti-poverty 
policy of the region. First, they target families in extreme poverty. Targeting in many cases is 
perceived as the best way to make spending of scarce resources more efficient. The most used 
tools for targeting are proxy-means tests, which estimate income of potential beneficiary 
households with data from national surveys. 
 
Secondly, CCTs provide benefits in the form of cash transfers, unlike previous anti-poverty 
initiatives that mostly delivered benefits in-kind like food subsidies. Some of the arguments 
made in favour of cash transfers have been that their administration is more straightforward 
and less intrusive with the functioning of local markets than distributing benefits like food 
baskets considering, that cash liquidity allows families to obtain better prices and that 
families would value more the autonomy that cash transfers grant them  (Levy and Rodriguez 
2005). Other arguments have been that spending on infrastructure can be regressive, 
availability of cash may allow families to embark on productive projects and protect them 
from risks, and that ultimately they act as incentives for families to invest in human capital 
 (Fizsbein and Schady 2009). Benefits are paid to women, usually the mother, because as they 
are considered to be better administrators and more concerned with equal distribution of 
scarce resources within households (Lavinas 2013; Levy 2006). In most cases amounts vary 
with the age, gender or school level of family members, but there are some programmes that 
pay flat rate benefits. 
 
Thirdly, CCTs prioritise families with children. There are some programmes that also pay 
benefits to families with no children or to the elderly or disabled; however, the main focus is 
always placed on families and children, since investment in children is seen as the way in 
which the intergenerational transmission of poverty will be broken and future adults will have 
the necessary human capital to escape poverty. That prioritisation represents the core element 
of the social investment logic; it is then that by investing in human capital now, CCTs seek to 
reduce poverty levels in the future. 
 
                                                 
1 For example, in Colombia and Perú, indeed the main objective is to promote human development, but in Brazil they are 
viewed as a social right that guarantees a minimum income to the population and in Argentina and Uruguay they are 
understood as the extension of family allowances already offered to formal sector workers (CEPAL, 2014). 
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Fourthly, all programmes set certain conditionalities that families must meet to preserve the 
right to receive benefits. Conditionalities have the objective to modify behavioural patterns of 
beneficiaries. Behavioural conditionalities were already being used in social programmes in 
other regions, but CCTs of Latin American design could perhaps represent the most popular 
example of their recent application to social policy  (Standing 2011); they mostly include 
school attendance by children and compliance with health appointments and activities by all 
members. Conditionalities impose a cost on recipients that is seen as beneficial to them by 
promoting the building of human capital  (Lavinas 2013).     
 
Lastly, CCTs have been extensively evaluated. Mexican designers made the decision to 
incorporate impact evaluations in the original design of Progresa, because they were 
concerned with the programme’s continuity given opposition from within the government 
and they wanted to demonstrate that their design could generate positive outcomes. 
Evaluations were outsourced to national and international research institutions to guarantee 
their reliability  (Levy and Rodriguez 2005). Early Brazilian initiatives were also seen to 
produce positive outcomes by international organisations  (Borges Sugiyama 2011; Sanchez-
Ancochea and Mattei 2011). Since then impact evaluations of CCTs in Latin America have 
become common. Randomised control trials and related approaches have been widely used, 
but other qualitative techniques have also been applied. Positive results from impact 
evaluations are one of the main factors that explain the diffusion of CCTs throughout Latin 
America and beyond. 
 
4. The Expansion of CCTs in Latin America  
 
The first country that experimented with conditional cash transfers was Chile, with the 
Unified Family Subsidy introduced in 1981  (Lavinas 2013), but the first large-scale CCTs 
emerged almost simultaneously in Brazil and Mexico during the second half of the 1990s, 
although under different contexts. In Brazil the programmes originated at the sub-national 
level in the cities of Campinas and the capital Brasilia in 1995, where left-leaning politicians 
took advantage of the fiscal and administrative decentralisation established by the Federal 
Constitution of 1988, landmark of the democratic transition from military rule, to introduce 
anti-poverty programmes that aimed in the first place to guarantee a basic income to poor 
families  (Sanchez-Ancochea and Mattei 2011; Borges Sugiyama 2011; Lavinas 2013). They 
quickly spread to other cities; two years later 88 cities had introduced their own CCT. In 
2001 they were scaled up to the national level, when the federal government introduced four 
cash transfers programmes; the main programme granted transfers for children in school and 
was called Bolsa Escola, like the original programme from Brasilia. Later, in 2003, the four 
types of transfers were fused into one single programme called Bolsa Famllia.  (Sanchez-
Ancochea and Mattei 2011; Borges Sugiyama 2008).  
 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the introduction of conditional cash transfers followed a top-
down route. The first programme was called Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition 
(Progresa), it was designed by federal public officials from the Secretariat of Finance 
concerned with the ineffectiveness of previous anti-poverty initiatives and the rise in poverty 
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levels caused by the Tequila crisis of 1995  (Borges Sugiyama 2011; Levy 2006; Levy and 
Rodriguez 2005). Officials began piloting schemes in the last quarter of 1995; the proposal 
was then sent to Congress in September of 1996 and in August of 1997 Progresa was 
implemented at the national level although only in rural areas  (Levy and Rodriguez 2005). 
The programme was renamed Oportunidades in 2002 and expanded to urban areas and new 
types of transfers were added during the next years. In 2014 more transfers were added and 
the name was changed to its current one Prospera  (SEDESOL 2014). 
 
From Brazil and Mexico CCTs rapidly spread to the rest of the region. By the mid-2000s 
virtually every country had introduced a programme at the national level. Table 1 shows the 
year of introduction of the first national programme, the political orientation of the 
government that introduced it and the name of the programme in 2015. Currently, 16 out of 
19 countries in the region have a CCT in operation. The only countries without a programme 
are Cuba and Venezuela2, which had never adopted one, and Nicaragua, which had 
introduced one in 2000 but cancelled it in 2006  (CEPAL 2014; Fizsbein and Schady 2009).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
CCTs cannot be associated with a particular political orientation since governments of all 
political spectrums have adopted them. Favourable economic conditions generated by the 
commodity boom might have enabled the expansion of CCTs, although not all countries 
registered high GDP growth rates, and in fact, in countries like Mexico, rates have been quite 
meagre throughout the last twenty years (World Bank 2016). Strong institutional structures 
are certainly one factor that must be considered when explaining social policy expansion in 
Latin America, especially when compared to expansion attempts in other so called 
‘developing’ regions (Barrientos 2011).  Yet, probably the most salient factor that can explain 
social policy expansion in Latin American countries is the democratic context (Haggard 
REF), under which CCTs were introduced.  
 
By the mid-1990s practically all countries had consolidated pluralist democratic regimes. 
Electoral competition has been suggested as the main reason for the adoption of CCTs across 
the region  (Borges Sugiyama 2011; Hall 2012; Feitosa de Britto 2008). This may not apply 
to all programmes, at least in the case of the first Mexican programme, for example, the 
implementation of Progresa was actually delayed until after the mid-term elections of 1997 to 
avoid possible political effects  (Levy and Rodriguez 2005). Nonetheless, democracy may 
have impacted policy in a different way, for example, by opening up the political 
environment and incorporating new actors into political and policy-making processes. In 
Brazil, leftist politicians who introduced the first CCTs would have never been in positions in 
power under a non-democratic regime.  
 
                                                 
2 Venezuela implemented in 2014 cash transfers for poor women who were domestic workers or were pregnant, for poor 
children under 17 years old and for disabled persons, but none of them are conditional. 
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Moreover, CCTs and the social investment perspectives have been identified as the 
governments’ responses to increases in poverty and inequality generated by neoliberalism 
(Jenson, 2010). In non-democratic contexts, governments may not have felt pressured to 
respond to such increases, or in the best of cases, they might have chosen the traditional path 
of clientelistic policies for social control.  
 
Still there is the question of why governments chose the particular design of CCTs to respond 
to rises in levels of poverty and inequality. Here, the results of impact evaluations were 
crucial to gain the endorsement of international organisations like the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). It has been argued that international 
organisations endorsed CCTs because they did not interfere with their market-centred 
ideology  (Lavinas 2013; Damian 2007). The promotion of the CCT model was supported by 
the evidence generated from short-term impact evaluations. However after almost two 
decades of their implementation in some countries, the time might have come to reassess the 
poverty reduction potential of CCTs –and more broadly of policies that prioritise human 
capital formation–, in order to identify the gaps that may be missing in anti-poverty 
strategies. This themed section aims to provide a modest contribution to that reassessment.  
 
5. CCTs and social outcomes in Latin America: achievements and limitations 
 
The positive impact of CCTs has been extensively discussed in the literature on Latin 
American social policy  (Levy 2006; Fizsbein and Schady 2009; Barrientos 2011). Since 
Mexican reformers took the decision to incorporate impact evaluations in the original design 
of Progresa, CCTs may well have become the most evaluated programmes in history, in 
many cases using randomised control trials and similar techniques, following the original 
design of evaluations of the Mexican programme, although other approaches have also been 
applied.  
 
Evaluations have provided ample evidence that CCTs increase consumption levels of 
beneficiary families, raise nutrition levels of children and in general of all family members, 
increase school attendance and reduce dropout rates, do not generate the withdrawal of 
beneficiaries from labour market participation, among several other positive results.  
 
Given the available evidence, the achievements of CCTs seem to be unquestionable; there 
are, however, several problems that have been identified like inclusion and exclusion errors 
of targeting mechanisms, lack of education and health infrastructure, negative effects on 
community relations, and ethical issues regarding randomised control trials, among others. 
These have also been extensively discussed elsewhere  (Damian 2007; Fizsbein and Schady 
2009); apart from them, there are questions that remain concerning several aspects of CCTs 
design and implementation that may limit their potential to combat poverty, some of which 
the articles in this themed section intend to address.  
 
Nagels (2016) provides further evidence on the gendered effects of CCTs from the Bolivian 
and Peruvian programmes; Ramírez (2016) analyses the implementation of the Mexican 
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programme and points out the importance of beneficiary-officer relationships for programme 
outcomes; and Medrano (2016) focuses on an area still very much understudied, the design of 
CCTs at the subnational level in Mexico, and identifies the principles followed in their design 
that may limit their impact.   
 
Jones (2016) points to the need to improve the quality of schooling and access to labour 
markets, in order to increase the potential of CCTs to combat poverty, providing evidence 
from Brazil. Her insights, as well as the article by Barrientos and Villa (2016) also found in 
this themed section, highlight the importance of assessing the long-term effects of CCTs in 
terms of poverty reduction and establishing if indeed they hold the capacity of breaking with 
the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Arguably, after several years, CCTs would be 
expected to have had an impact on poverty rates, which at the end should be the main 
objective of any country’s anti-poverty policy. In most Latin American countries the 
programmes have been in operation for more than one decade, and in the case of the first 
programmes like the Mexican one, for almost two. 
 
The expansion of CCTs has coincided with important reductions in poverty not observed for 
several decades in the region, yet not at the same rate in every country. Table 2 presents for 
each country with a CCT in 2015, coverage percentages of total and poor population, 
spending on CCTs as percentages of GDP, and extreme and overall poverty rates for the 
beginning and the end of the periods when CCTs have been in operation. All data was taken 
from ECLAC’s reports and website statistics.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
There are significant differences on coverage and spending levels and on variations in 
poverty rates across countries. The country with the highest coverage percentage of the total 
population in recent years is Guatemala –more than 25 per cent of the total population–, with 
Brazil and Mexico –where CCTs where pioneered– occupying the second and fourth places 
also covering around one quarter of the population. At the other end, the Chilean and Costa 
Rican programmes only deliver benefits to 4.1 and 3 per cent of the population, respectively. 
 
Regarding spending on CCTs, the countries with the largest budgets are Brazil and Mexico 
(ECLAC 2014), but when measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by 
the second decade of the 21st century the country devoting more resources to its CCT was 
Ecuador with almost one per cent, whilst Chile was the lowest spender, with only 0.14 per 
cent, and the regional mean was 0.32 per cent. 
 
On the other hand, the country that has been more successful at reducing extreme poverty 
after adopting a CCT was Peru, where the rate fell 83 per cent, followed by Uruguay with a 
reduction of 70 per cent and Brazil of 55 per cent. The less successful countries were Panama 
and Costa Rica, where the rate dropped only 16 and 6 per cent, respectively. Given the 
differences in the  
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Figure 1 shows the correlation of average spending on CCTs as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for the periods when CCTs have been in operation in each country 
and proportional variations of extreme poverty rates during a similar period. The figure 
presents the z-scores of both indicators, with the x-axis representing changes in poverty rates 
and the y-axis spending. Therefore, countries on the positive side of the x-axis register 
poverty reductions higher than the mean and countries on the negative side lower than the 
mean; countries on the positive side of the y-axis spend more than the mean and on the 
negative side lower than mean spending.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
There is not a strong correlation between spending on CCTs and reductions in extreme 
poverty. Ecuador, Uruguay, Brazil and Bolivia are countries of spending levels above the 
region’s average, that at the same time have achieved reductions of poverty rates above the 
average. However, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Mexico are high spenders, also 
above or very close to the average, but register mediocre results in terms of poverty 
reduction. The case of Mexico stands out because it is the country with the oldest 
programme, yet poverty rates have remained at practically the same level throughout the last 
two decades  (CONEVAL 2014). 
 
On the other hand, there are countries that spend on CCTs less than the region’s average but 
have a better record at reducing extreme poverty. Such are the cases of Peru, Colombia and 
Chile. Peru stands out in the figure because it is one of the countries that spends less as but 
has the best record at reducing extreme poverty. The dispersion of cases suggests that 
spending on CCTs may not be necessarily associated with poverty reductions. It could be 
argued that social investment programmes that promote human capital do not seek to have an 
immediate impact on poverty, nonetheless almost 20 years of operation of CCTs in Mexico 
should be expected to be sufficient to reduce poverty at least to the same of higher degree 
than counties that spend less and/or that have had a CCT for a shorter period, but thas not 
happened. On the contrary, several countries in the region devote less resources to CCTs yet 
perform better in terms of poverty reduction.  
 
Barrientos and Villa (2016) point out that success in the combat against poverty will 
ultimately depend on the creation of favourable labour market conditions. Sánchez Ancochea 
and Martínez Franzoni (2014) argue that effective reductions in inequality depends on 
processes of market incorporation, that include strong industrial policies, growth of minimum 
wages and promotion of labour rights and collective bargaining, and social incorporation, that 
include expansion of social protection through universal and targeted programmes. 
Elsewhere, Barrientos (2011) and authors like Lavinas (2013) and Lustig et al  (2011), have 
also highlighted the central importance of labour earnings for poverty reduction. To illustrate 
these arguments, figure 2 presents the correlation between variations in extreme poverty 
reduction and variations in the average earnings of the employed population as a proportion 
of poverty lines, during the periods that CCTs have been implemented in each country. The 
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latter is an indicator used by the ECLAC to compare average labour earnings in the region; 
for example, in Brazil between 2001 when CCTs were adopted at the national scale and 2013, 
the latest year available, average earnings passed from representing 4.4 times the poverty line 
to 5.9 times. On the other hand, in Mexico the indicator actually fell and average earnings 
dropped from 3.3 times the poverty line in 1996 to 2.9 in 2012. Like figure 1 above, this 
figure also graphs the z-scores; the x-axis represents variations in poverty rates and the y-axis 
the average earnings indicator.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
As can be observed, all countries that have achieved above average improvements in extreme 
poverty rates also register increases in average earnings above the mean, namely the countries 
on the top-right quadrant like Peru, Uruguay, Brazil and others. Countries on the bottom-left 
quadrant are poor performers in both poverty reduction and earnings levels, like Mexico and 
Costa Rica. No single country falls in the bottom-right quadrant, which means that there is 
not a country that is a good a performer in terms of poverty reduction but a poor performer in 
labour earnings.  
 
The case of Mexico stands out again. This the country where labour earnings have fallen the 
most for the period when CCTs have been in operation (ECLAC 2015). At the same time, 
poverty rates have remained at practically the same levels, so spending on CCTs may only be 
avoiding further drops in poverty rates. In other words, the expansion of social policy is 
merely subsidising the fall in labour earnings. The question that remains then is how have 
some countries in the region managed to achieve improvements in labour earnings and others 
do not.  
 
One factor to consider is increases to the minimum wage. As has been noted by several 
authors, the minimum wage in Latin America performs a fundamental welfare function. 
Many countries introduced minimum wage legislation during the first decades of the 
twentieth century, since then variations in minimum wages have been used as benchmarks to 
set wage increases in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy and to calculate 
amounts of social policy benefits and contributions  (Barrientos 2011; Lavinas 2013; Lavinas 
and Simoes 2015).  
 
Figure 3 shows the proportional increases to the real minimum wage between 2000 and 2013, 
considering inflation rates. There are some caveats that should be considered here, for 
example, in some cases minimum wages could have been set at extremely low amounts at the 
beginning of the period and there may me problems with compliance rates across the 
economy. However, percentage increases do suggest that countries where the minimum wage 
has increased more, average earnings have also increased. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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Uruguay, Brazil and Ecuador are the countries where average earnings have increased the 
most and are also the countries with the highest increases to real minimum wages, in the first 
case of 156 per cent, in the second one of 103 per cent and in the third one of 53 per cent, at 
the same level than Bolivia. On the other, poor performers in terms of labour earnings 
register meagre real increases to minimum wage, like Mexico and the Dominican Republic. 
Increases in minimum wages then show a strong explanatory potential of differences in 
poverty reduction across Latin American countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The expansion of social protection in Latin America has been mainly driven by the social 
investment perspective through CCTs. The positive effects of that expansion are evident. The 
fact is that today millions of Latin American families that in previous decades would have 
been neglected by the state, today receive significant benefits that help them improve their 
nutritional, educational and health status. Nonetheless, the question is whether CCTs 
designed under the influence of the social investment approach can generate long-term 
substantial improvements in social outcomes. 
 
The analysis presented in this article suggests that CCTs are not enough. If CCTs ultimate 
aim is to reduce poverty then they seem to work better when they are accompanied by –or 
form part of– a wider package of measures that enhance social and employment rights, 
integrating workers into formal economy under better conditions. As Martínez Franzoni and 
Sánchez-Ancochea (2014) point out, substantial long lasting improvements in inequality and 
poverty will depend on the successful adoption of processes of market and social integration. 
Such changes imply addressing the structural factors contributing to the persistence of 
poverty in the political economy of welfare in most Latin American countries.   
 
It has been argued that concerns with human capital formation for the design of social 
policies were adopted to divert the attention from addressing structural issues of Latin 
American countries (Lavinas, 2013). Further research on the causes of poverty and inequality 
in the region and the best ways to overcome them, would benefit from investigating the 
economic and political internal and external factors, that can result in solid long-term 
improvements in living standards for the majority of the population. Our evidence suggests 
that unless the structural deficiencies of the political economies sustaining most Latin 
American welfare regimes are addressed, the potential of social investment policies to 
combat poverty in the region will remain limited.   
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Table 1. Introduction of CCTs in Latin American countries 
Country 
Introduction of first CCTa/ 
National programme in 2015 
Year  Government 
Argentina 2004 Centre-left Asignación Universal por Hijo 
Bolivia 2006 Left 
Bono Juancito Pinto 
Bono Niño-Niña Juana Uzurduy  
Brazil 2001 Centre Bolsa Familia 
Chile 2002 Centre-left Ingreso Ético Familiar 
Colombia 2000 Centre-right Más Familias en Acción 
Costa Rica 2000 Centre-right Avancemos 
Dominican Republic 2005 Centre Progresando con Solidaridad 
Ecuador 2003 Centre-left Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
El Salvador 2005 Right Comunidades Solidarias 
Guatemala 2008 Right Mi Bono Seguro 
Honduras 1998 Centre 
Programa de Asignación 
Familiar 
Mexico 1997 Centre-right 
Prospera Programa de Inclusión 
Social 
Nicaraguab/ 2000 Right … 
Panama 2006 Centre-left Red de Oportunidades 
Paraguay 2005 Right Tekoporâ 
Peru 2005 Centre-right Juntos 
Uruguay 2005 Centre Asignaciones Familiares 
Sources:  Borges Sugiyama (2011) and  CEPAL (2015). 
Notes: 
a/ Year of introduction of first national programme. 
b/ Nicaragua’s programme was cancelled in 2006. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of CCTs and Variations of Poverty Rates 
Country 
Coverage 
Spending  
% of 
GDPc/ 
Poverty ratesd/ (% of total population) 
% of total 
populationa/ 
% of poor 
populationb/ 
Year of CCT 
introduction  
Around 2014 
Extreme 
poverty 
Overall 
poverty 
Extreme 
poverty 
Overall 
poverty 
Argentinae/ 8.6 46.4 0.40 … … … … 
Boliviaf/ 26.5 38.8 0.51 31.0 53.8 18.7 36.2 
Brazil 26.6 84.6 0.48 13.2 37.4 5.9 18.0 
Chile 4.1 51.7 0.15 4.6 18.6 2.5 7.8 
Colombia 9.2 56.5 0.27 17.6 49.4 9.1 30.6 
Costa Rica 3.0 17.4 0.18 7.7 20.3 7.2 17.7 
Dominican 
Republic 
24.9 46.3 0.21 24.6 47.5 20.2 40.7 
Ecuadorg/ 16.9 100.0 0.93 22.3 51.1 12.0 33.6 
El Salvador 6.09 17.1 0.28 17.3 47.9 12.4 40.9 
Guatemalah/ 27.3 39.7 0.20 29.0 54.7 … … 
Hondurasi/ 8.7 12.3 … 56.5 79.5 45.4 69.0 
Mexico 24.6 62.8 0.23 18.4 46.8 14.2 37.1 
Panama 8.5 39.5 0.14 14.0 29.5 11.8 22.8 
Paraguay 6.4 13.9 0.16 27.3 56.4 19.0 40.5 
Peru 10.2 21.2 0.19 27.3 45.2 4.7 24.0 
Uruguay 15.5 84.6 0.46 3.0 17.7 0.9 5.6 
Sources:  ECLAC (2015),  CEPAL (2014),  CEPAL (2015). 
Notes: a/ Coverage percentages of total population for the years 2013-2015, depending on the latest available 
for each country in the Base de datos de programas de protección social no contributiva en América Latina y el 
Caribe  CEPAL (2015), except Honduras which corresponds to 2009 taken from ECLAC (2014). 
b/ Coverage percentages of poor population including Extreme and Overall Poverty for the years 2008-2009, 
taken from (ECLAC 2014). 
c/ Spending percentages for the years 2012-2014, except for Chile and Panama (2011), Bolivia (2010) and El 
Salvador (2007), latest available in CEPAL (2015). 
d/ Poverty rates estimated by ECLAC in absolute terms. Extreme poverty, also called indigence, is measured in 
terms of the minimum income necessary to purchase a basic food basket to cover a person’s nutrition needs. 
Overall poverty, referred simply as poverty by ECLAC, adds to the indigence poverty line additional goods and 
services required to meet basic non-nutritional needs (ECLAC 2016). The rates presented in the table 
correspond to the closest year available to the year of introduction of the first CCT and the last year available in 
ECLAC’s database. 
e/ ECLAC does not report poverty rates for Argentina. 
f/ Coverage corresponds to the two programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Bono Niño-Niña Juana Uzurduy, 
spending only to the former because no data is reported for the latter. 
g/ The percentages of 100 per cent of total population covered with 16.9 per cent of total population can be 
explained because the former corresponds to 2009 and the latter to 2015.   
h/ No data on poverty around 2014 for Guatemala because the latest year available by ECLAC is 2006. 
i/ ECLAC does not report data spending for Honduras. 
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Figure 1. Extreme Poverty Reduction and Spending on CCTs (z-scores) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration with data from  ECLAC (2015) and  (CEPAL 2015) 
Notes: 
 Correlation coefficient 0.18 
 x axis: proportional variations of national absolute extreme poverty rates for approximate 
periods when CCTs have been in operation in each country. 
 y axis: average annual spending on CCTs as a percentage of GDP until the latest year 
available in ECLAC’s database. 
 The following countries were not included: 
 Argentina because ECLAC does not report poverty rates for that country. 
 Honduras because ECLAC does not report spending percentages of GDP and Guatemala 
because only one year of spending is reported. 
 To complement series on spending, budget as a percentage of GDP instead of spending 
was used if available in ECLAC’s database, in the cases of the following countries and 
years: 
Bolivia 2009, 2011 and 2012, only for the programme Bono Juancito Pinto, since no data 
is reported for the Bono Niño-Niña Juana Uzurduy except for 2009 budget (0.04% of 
GDP), which was added to the calculations. 
Chile 2012 and 2013. 
El Salvador 2008-2012. 
Mexico 2014  
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Figure 2. Poverty Reduction and Variations in Average Earnings (z-scores) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration with data from  ECLAC (2015). 
Notes: 
 Correlation coefficient 0.68 
 x axis: proportional variations of national extreme poverty rates for approximate periods 
when CCTs have been in operation in each country. 
 y axis: variations of the indicator average wages in times the national poverty lines for 
periods when CCTs have been in operation in each country.  
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Figure 3. Minimum Wage Increases, 2000/2013 (% of 2000)  
  
Source: Own elaboration with data from ILO (2014). 
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